Drawing on recent social changes, Dr. Acar highlights that university-educated women tend to marry at a later age than women with lower levels of education. The study primarily focuses on women’s marriage behavior, yet Acar points out that people generally marry others with similar characteristics, and education plays a significant role in marriage decisions. He explains that while less-educated women may have a higher chance of marrying well-educated men, a man with only a high school diploma is far less likely to marry a university-educated woman—especially in Turkey.

Dr. Taylan Acar’s research interests include social stratification, inequality, sociology of education, migration, demography, and sociology of work. He completed his undergraduate and graduate studies at Boğaziçi University and earned his Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 2016. We spoke with Dr. Acar about his study and the role of education in shaping marriage behavior.

Could you share details about your research—such as when it was conducted, the methods used, the number of participants, and how the interviews were carried out?

Taylan Acar: The research focuses primarily on women’s marriage behavior rather than men’s, although men’s characteristics are of course relevant. In demography and the sociology of education, we often ask, “Who marries whom?” My study seeks to answer this question in the Turkish context. Previous research has partially addressed it, but since the number of university students in Turkey has doubled over the last decade, we can expect significant changes in marriage and childbearing behavior. I aim to understand how this transition unfolds.

Unfortunately, the pandemic disrupted my research plans—we had intended to begin fieldwork in February–March but couldn’t. We are currently continuing fieldwork, while I also analyze data from the 2008 and 2013 Turkey Demographic and Health Surveys. My study uses a nationally representative sample, conducting face-to-face interviews with about 1,500 randomly selected women.

Could you describe the socioeconomic profile and age range of the women who participated?

We interview women aged 15 to 49—those considered to be in their reproductive and marriageable years. Since the sample is random, we can’t specify a socioeconomic profile in advance. The only criteria are gender and age range.

Marriage is one of life’s most important decisions. Could you elaborate on the sociological effects of education on this decision?

Education is one of the social institutions influencing marriage decisions. People marry for many reasons, but most often they marry those similar to themselves—and education plays a key role in that similarity. Educated individuals tend to marry educated individuals, while those with less education tend to marry within their own group. I’m sure we could even observe this by specific schools; for instance, I would confidently claim that many Boğaziçi University graduates are married to other Boğaziçi graduates, though I don’t have direct data to prove it—fifty years of research suggests this pattern.

Two important caveats apply here. First, in the Turkish context, marriage refers to heterosexual unions, as other forms are not legally recognized and therefore fall outside my study. Second, gender matters: historically, women have been less educated, so when they marry outside their own group, it’s usually “upward”—to more educated men. In contrast, it’s very rare for men—especially in Turkey—to marry women with higher educational attainment. This reflects a dominant masculinity ideology that resists marrying a woman who is “more qualified.”

Why do educated individuals tend to marry later?

There are three main reasons.
First, logistical: in Turkey, it is rare to marry while still studying, so higher education naturally delays marriage by two to five years.
Second, economic: as education increases, people no longer view marriage as an economic necessity or a source of financial stability. Educated women, in particular, are less likely to rely on marriage for financial security.
Third, preferences: education shapes expectations. Educated individuals—especially women—tend to seek partners with similar educational backgrounds. This is a central focus of my research.

In social science, we refer to this as the “marriage market”—the pool of potential partners one might meet and marry. For example, a woman living in a small village has a limited marriage market consisting of local young men, whereas a Boğaziçi student’s marriage market includes peers at the university, colleagues at internships or future workplaces, and men from similar educational circles. The key point is that education changes where a person is going, not just where they come from—it reshapes social boundaries and expectations.

You note that “support for gender equality among educated women is one of the factors that delays marriage.” Could you explain this relationship?

Educated women have different expectations from marriage. A Boğaziçi University graduate, for instance, is unlikely to marry a man who tells her, “Don’t work,” “Don’t see your friends,” or “Let’s live with my parents.” While domestic violence unfortunately still exists, educated women tend to seek respect and autonomy in their relationships. Regardless of the man’s education level, they look for partners who value their independence and choices. If they cannot find such partners, they are more likely than less-educated women to delay or forgo marriage altogether. In short, gender ideology is crucial—educated women expect equality and respect within marriage.

How do your findings relate to current debates around the Istanbul Convention?

They are closely connected. The broad public support for the Istanbul Convention among women—including those from conservative and religious backgrounds—demonstrates the societal shift I’m describing. Regardless of ideology, educated women demand respect and autonomy within the home. This is a fundamental transformation.

Does your research explore how marriage is perceived differently by educated and uneducated individuals?

Yes, that’s central to my argument. As more women earn university degrees, marriage becomes less of an “escape from the parental home” and more of a deliberate personal choice. Education also expands social circles, enabling women to meet potential partners from diverse backgrounds rather than only within their local communities. However, this also reduces inter-class marriages, reinforcing social and economic inequality—since educated couples tend to pass their advantages on to their children.

What is the difference in marriage age between university graduates and less-educated individuals?

According to 2013 data, the gap in average age at first marriage is more than four years, and the 2018 survey suggests this difference has widened to about six years. For women with secondary education or higher, the average age at first marriage is 25; for those who completed middle school, it is 20; and for women with little or no education, it is around 19.
While the age of marriage is rising, marriage remains a very strong institution in Turkey—most people still marry despite economic challenges.

Do you have data on how current university students view marriage and their life plans?

I have some ideas, but to answer this properly, we need an in-depth qualitative study on how young adults conceptualize marriage today. I don’t yet have concrete data on that.

Any final thoughts?

Reality television programs like Gelin Evi (“Bride’s House”)—where women are represented only as “wives” and judged by their dowries or wedding preparations—reflect lingering traditional gender norms. These portrayals coexist with the transformations I’ve described. Despite all the social changes, marriage remains an incredibly resilient institution in Turkey.